Final Study Guide: Main Concepts and Themes of Study

Chapter -1

Essay and Discussion Questions

 1. Explain "systems" thinking. What are its strong points and
   its weak points? What is the danger of reification?

 2. What happened around 1870, in Europe and Asia , to disrupt 
   the balance‑of‑power system of the European empires?

 3. What were the main features of the Cold War bipolar system? 
   Was it stable? Could it have lasted indefinitely?

 4. What new system is emerging? How can you tell? Is this new  
   system likely to be stable?

 5. "States dominate our thinking only because we let them. If we
   would psychologically cure ourselves of state‑worship, the  
   world could live in peace." Agree or disagree. 

 6. Explain Huntington 's "clash of civilizations"           theory. Do news events since 9/11 confirm or             refute the theory?

Chapter -2

1. How could the thirteen colonies have "national interests"
   before they were a nation?

 2. What is the difficulty in defining your national interest in
   any given situation?

 3. Why was the nineteenth century a poor guide for U.S. national
   security in the twentieth century?

 4. Why did the United States turn to imperialism in the late
   nineteenth century?

 5. How were the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and Kennan's "X"
   article all part of the same policy?

Chapter - 3

1. Is the concept of "political generations" valid? If so, what 

   views do your generation bring to politics, especially world 

   politics? 

 2. Could U.S. presidents have decided differently and kept us out

   of Vietnam? Consider the U.S. political climate of the time.

 3. Explain "guerrilla warfare," especially its political        

   ramifications, drawing illustrations from Vietnam.

 4. Agree or disagree: "Kennedy, not LBJ, committed the United

   States to war in Vietnam."

 5. Was the Tonkin Gulf Resolution "the functional equivalent of

   a declaration of war," as the Johnson administration argued?

Chapter 4. Can the US Lead the world?

. Does the United States have a split personality on intervening

   overseas?

U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was clear: stop the Communists. Now it is unclear; there is no consensus. The great question, posed by Spykman and others, is whether to use troops overseas: to intervene or not?  For most of the 19th century, the U.S. intervened little. With World War II and the Cold War, the U.S. intervened massively. Vietnam partially changed that, inducing caution. Behavioralist Klingberg saw a cycle in U.S. foreign policy from "extroversion" to "introversion." U.S. public opinion is fickle and has an isolationist streak that was submerged by the Cold War. U.S. elites are more internationalist than the masses. A box discusses idealism v. self-interest in foreign policy.

There is more continuity than change in the foreign policies of presidents, especially from Truman to Reagan. Several factors constrain presidents in foreign policy. Entitlements eat most of the U.S. budget, and major deficits have returned. There is no military draft; the 1.4 million all-volunteer armed forces are stretched thin, especially because of Iraq. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon are cautious about overseas intervention.

Some have suggested that the very structure of U.S. foreign policy is defective: big and sprawling, lacking central control. The National Security Council, set up to wage the Cold War, has grown to become the focus of foreign‑policy making. Its National Security Adviser and staff have proximity to the president and the ability to act secretly to make them preeminent over the conventional departments and unsupervised by Congress. The Iran‑

contra foulup illustrates what can go wrong with such a body. Do bureaucracies make foreign policy?  We rather doubt it. Recent studies undermine Allison's "bureaucratic politics" model of the Cuban missile crisis, for they show JFK was little influenced by bureaucrats; he rejected plans to attack Cuba. The 1971 Pentagon Papers show sober and realistic bureaucratic assessments of Vietnam, nothing that deceived decision makers. Ambassador Glaspie simply obeyed orders in her conciliatory words to Saddam Hussein in 1990. Bureaucratic politics does take place, but usually after the orders have been given and the stage set.

The Bush 43 administration brought neo-conservatives to Washington, and they implemented interventionist and unilateralist foreign policies, especially the 2003 Iraq War, that were at odds with the older Republican conservatism that featured caution and isolationism.

GOOD LUCK